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Esta tesis doctoral pone punto final a lo largo y sinuoso camino de investigación que 
se inició en el curso académico 2010/11 con la realización de los cursos de pre-doctorado y de 
master del Departamento de Economía de la Universidad de Granada (UGR). Esta tesis recoge 
tres trabajos de investigación en el campo de la economía experimental, realizados durante mis 
años de estudio como doctoranda en el programa de Economía Industrial e Internacional que 
detenta el Departamento de Economía de la Universitat Jaume I de Castellón. 
El objeto de estudio y nexo de unión entre estos distintos trabajos que están presentados 
en los siguientes capítulos, queda perfectamente reflejado en el título de la tesis 
“Comportamiento de los consumidores en diferentes escenarios económicos: La disposición a 
negociar, la disposición a pagar y la disposición a comprar”. Es bien conocido y estudiado que 
el comportamiento de los consumidores se afecta por varias razones. En este trabajo intento 
investigar algunos factores que pueden afectar este comportamiento cuando los consumidores 
tienen que tomar una decisión económica. Esta tesis se basa sobre tres distintos y diferentes 
pilares. A continuación voy a referirme brevemente a los temas que trata cada uno de los tres 
proyectos. 
En primer lugar, quería investigar la diferencia entre la manera y la voluntad con que 
los dos géneros pueden negociar utilizando un típico juego de la teoría de los juegos, el juego 
del ultimátum. La sensación de conflicto está escrito en los genes de los seres humanos por lo 
que la simbiosis de géneros está lejos de ser armoniosa. A pesar del hecho de que los seres 
humanos son la especie más cooperativa de la tierra (Seabright, 2012), esta cooperación de 
ninguna manera implica la ausencia de conflictos; por el contrario, se la impone. El conflicto 
no siempre implica que hay intereses opuestos dentro de una asociación entre hombres y 
mujeres. Al contrario, implica que los intereses de los socios no están alienados por completo 
o simplemente que ambas partes creen que deben ser el líder en una u otra situación. Sin 
embargo, a fin de que surjan las sinergias entre las habilidades de un hombre y de una mujer en 
el contexto de una casa tradicional, surge la necesidad para los dos socios de negociar y acordar 
la forma en que se alcanzan los diferentes resultados y se dividen los beneficios obtenidos. 
Tienen que entender que mediante la cooperación tienen algo muy importante para ganar: es 
decir, una asociación que maximiza la utilidad de ambos socios. Metafóricamente, esta 
situación se asemeja a un juego del ultimátum con participantes de diferentes géneros que 
representan a las partes de dicha negociación. Los participantes se pueden metafóricamente ser 
percibidos como consumidores y las parejas que se formulan en el contexto del experimento 
representan la negociación entre un vendedor y un cliente que tienen que alcanzar un acuerdo. 
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El juego del ultimátum, consiste en un jugador que propone un reparto de un excedente 
y un segundo jugador que debe aceptar o rechazar esa oferta sin posibilidad de hacer una 
contraoferta. Si llegan a un acuerdo se reparten el excedente como se ha acordado. Sin embargo, 
si no se llegarse a un acuerdo, en este tipo de juegos ninguno ganaría nada. Los datos utilizados 
en este experimento han sido extraídos de una situación tipo ultimátum entre jugadores de 
géneros diferentes y con la posibilidad de comunicación unidireccional del parte de 
respondedor después de la presentación de su decisión. En este caso, por tanto nuestro juego se 
basa en el reparto de una oferte de dinero del parte de sujeto A al que denominaremos 
proponente, y un beneficio para un sujeto B al que llamaremos respondedor. El reparto está 
condicionado a alcanzar un acuerdo, ya que existe un interés común; preferir un acuerdo a un 
desacuerdo. También existe un conflicto entre la partición de dicho reparto, ya que cada jugador 
preferirá obtener la mayor proporción posible del excedente a repartir. Más que esto, el 
respondedor puede expresar sus sentimientos sobre cada oferta de dinero y de esta manera guiar 
el proponente hacia ofertas preferibles. 
En cada sesión, los sujetos fueron asignados al papel ya sea del proponente o del 
respondedor de acuerdo a su género. Sin embargo, los sujetos del mismo sexo tenían todos los 
mismos papeles en el experimento. Los sujetos fueron puestos en parejas de una vez y por toda 
la duración de la sesión estaban en la misma aula, pero no estaban al tanto del sujeto con que 
iban a negociar. El experimento fue diseñado y ejecutado mediante el software Z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). En cada período, la tarea del proponente era colocar una oferta de € X, lo 
que podría ser cualquier cantidad entre 0 € y 20 €, en pasos de € 0.1. Los pares de proponentes 
y de respondedores fueron fijos durante el experimento. Un respondedor que fue seleccionado 
al azar para ser emparejado con un proponente recibió una oferta y debería aceptarla o 
rechazarla. Con el fin de prevenir los efectos acumulativos de la riqueza, los sujetos se les 
pagaron de acuerdo a sus ingresos por un período especificado al final de la sesión. En cuanto 
a realidad, la limitación de los activos ha predeterminado que sólo el 80% de los sujetos de cada 
sesión podrían ser pagados y ellos fueron recogidos de nuevo en orden aleatorio al final de cada 
sesión. Este hecho fue anunciado a todos los participantes al inicio del experimento. 
Cada sesión incluye 4 partes dependiendo del papel de cada género en el juego, así 
como la presencia o ausencia de comunicación. Sin embargo, a los proponentes no se les 
permitió a responder al mensaje enviado por los respondedores, ya que era imperativo mantener 
secreto el contenido de los mensajes entre los miembros de cada grupo. Hemos adoptado este 
tipo de diseño experimental con el fin de buscar posibles efectos que los mensajes podrían tener 
sobre el comportamiento de los participantes en las sub-secciones con comunicación, mientras 
que en el mismo tiempo estábamos en busca de un impacto del mensaje en las sub-secciones 
sin comunicación cuando se llevaron a cabo después de los subsecciones con mensajes.  
 
 
12 
 
En segundo lugar, quería investigar el efecto del descriptor "regar con agua reciclada" 
en el nivel de la preferencia y de la disposición a pagar por productos alimenticios. El aumento 
intensivo en la producción agrícola de las últimas décadas ha contribuido en la explotación de 
los recursos hídricos. Por otra parte, la forma de vida moderna ha dado lugar a la producción 
de grandes rutas de flujo de aguas residuales. En consecuencia, en muchas regiones con escasez 
de agua, efluentes de plantas de tratamiento de aguas residuales (agua reciclada) se reutilizan 
para el riego de cultivos agrícolas (Angelakis et al., 1999; Anderson, 2003; Paranychianakis et 
al., 2006). El reciclaje del agua, sobre todo para el riego, se ha desarrollado como una fuente 
alternativa de agua con el fin de ahorrar agua dulce y de eliminar la escasez de agua. Además, 
sirve para aumentar el regadío y al mismo tiempo para cumplir con los criterios de calidad del 
agua requerida a fin de que los riesgos ecológicos y peligros para la salud pública se eliminen 
(Paranychianakis et al., 2015). 
En el campo de la comercialización, la aceptación pública es el principal obstáculo en 
el uso de agua reciclada o en el consumo de productos agrícolas regados con agua 
reciclada. Persuadir a la gente a usar el agua reciclada se ha demostrado ser muy difícil y la 
aceptación pública del agua sigue siendo el principal desafío en la implementación exitosa de 
reutilizarlo (Nancarrow et al., 2008).  A pesar del llamado "factor rechazo" (yuck factor), que 
se ha destacado en la literatura (por ejemplo, Menegaki et al., 2009) desde la década de los 
1970, se ha avanzado poco en la investigación dirigida a explorar la conexión entre el uso de 
agua reciclada y la evitación, relacionada con el disgusto, a consumir productos que incorporan 
en su proceso de producción este tipo de agua. 
Otro factor que quería investigar en este trabajo es la disposición a pagar por el agua 
reciclada o para productos alimenticios para los que agua reciclada se ha utilizado durante el 
proceso de producción. En varios trabajos sobre este tema, se ha encontrado que, las personas 
más y mejor informados sobre el agua reciclada y los productos regados de este tipo de agua, 
están dispuestos a pagar más por esta y por sus subproductos (Tsagarakis & Georgantzís, 2003). 
Hasta donde sabemos, ninguno de los trabajos publicados sobre la relación entre los 
descriptores de la calidad del agua y de la voluntad de utilizarlo ha tratado el consumo real de 
los productos agrícolas regados con agua reciclada. En este estudio hemos abordado este 
tema. En concreto, se investigó, con un experimento, el efecto de los descriptores de 
procedencia del agua (irrigado con "agua limpia" o con "agua reciclada") en la evaluación del 
producto y en la disposición a pagar por ello. Por esta rezón, se pidió a cada participante en el 
experimento de probar pasas de uva a partir de dos cajas, diseñadas e impresas 
profesionalmente, casi idénticas. La única diferencia entre las cajas (y su contenido) fue el 
descriptor del agua con que los frutos fueron supuestamente irrigados; una caja indicó que la 
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viña, donde se produjeron las pasas se regó con " agua limpia", mientras que la otra caja indicó 
que se regó con "agua reciclada". El propósito de este diseño fue determinar si la información 
relativa al origen del agua sola (agua limpia o reciclada) era suficiente para alterar la percepción 
de los participantes sobre la calidad de dichos productos agrícolas. 
 Después de terminar el proceso de cata, los participantes se encargaron de responder 
a un breve cuestionario, preguntando su opinión sobre el sabor, la apariencia, la calidad y las 
diferencias entre los dos "tipos" de pasas. Además, se registró la disposición de los participantes 
para comprar y para pagar por las pasas de la misma calidad de los que estaban en cada caja. 
Una serie de hipótesis se pusieron a prueba. Las hipótesis eran que, si bien las muestras 
son de calidad idéntica, la información de origen (agua limpia y agua reciclada) afectaría a 
juicio de los participantes de una manera consistente con el llamado "factor asco". 
En tercer lugar, y dado mi interés sobre temas ambientales, quería investigar la 
disposición a pagar para productos orgánicos y la diferencia entre esta disposición en un 
escenario hipotético y uno real. La conciencia medioambiental durante las dos últimas décadas, 
junto con la preocupación por la calidad de los productos y la demanda de alimentos más 
seguros han llevado a los consumidores a cuestionar las prácticas agrícolas modernas. Se ha 
encontrado, que los consumidores consideran las características perceptibles de los alimentos, 
como la apariencia y el sabor, como los factores más importantes en la elección de los alimentos 
(Magnusson et al., 2001). Sin embargo, existe una fuerte evidencia de que otros atributos de 
alimentos, no tan fácilmente tangibles, como por ejemplo su calidad y proceso de producción, 
se están volviendo cada vez más importantes (Torjusen et al., 2001). Esta nueva forma de 
pensar ha dado lugar a un aumento en la demanda de productos agrícolas orgánicos, que son 
percibidos como menos perjudiciales para el medio ambiente y más saludables que los 
producidos convencionales (Williams & Hammit, 2001). 
En muchos casos, los consumidores parecen estar dispuestos a pagar más dinero para 
la compra de productos, especialmente frutas y verduras, que son libres de sustancias tóxicas y 
son beneficiosos para la salud (Tranter et al, 2009; Batte et al, 2007). En la literatura se han 
llevado a cabo varias investigaciones centradas específicamente en la determinación de la 
disposición del consumidor a pagar por algunas características específicas de los bienes 
(Combris et al., 2002). La mayoría de estos estudios, están basados en un escenario hipotético 
con el objetivo de proporcionar evidencia sobre cómo los signos de calidad influyen en la 
calidad percibida del producto, pero no ponen los consumidores en virtud de un dilema real a 
través de la cual se puede observar su verdadera disposición a pagar (DAP) por estos productos 
y su disposición para comprarlos. ¿Qué ocurre cuando los consumidores se enfrentan a los 
verdaderos precios de tales productos? ¿Su voluntad declarada de pago difiere de su real? 
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Para  detectar las posibles diferencias en la DAP entre la declarada DAP y la real DAP 
utilizamos un experimento de elección dicotómica poniendo los participantes a seleccionar 
entre un producto orgánico y un producto convencional del mismo tipo. El producto que hemos 
utilizado es las aceitunas comestibles. Técnicamente, este experimento se asemeja a un 
mecanismo de votación entre los dos productos. En este mecanismo de votación lo que se 
requiere, a excepción de la limitación a sólo dos alternativas, es la suposición de que las 
personas perciben que sus utilidades podrían verse afectadas por el resultado de la votación. 
La novedad de esta investigación es que es la primera en validar experimentalmente 
datos de la encuesta sobre la DAP por un solo atributo ambiental de un producto de mercado 
cuando se utiliza el descriptor "orgánico", con el fin de definir su origen. Junto con las 
comparaciones de la inclinación de los consumidores a favor de los productos orgánicos, el 
diseño del experimento tiene como objetivo comparar la DAP declarada y la real a nivel 
individual. En este contexto, la DAP declarada de cada participante en la parte hipotética se 
compara con su disposición a pagar real en una sesión experimental, diseñada para ser 
económicamente viable y apropiada para replicar una situación de elección real dentro de un 
laboratorio. 
La validez de las respuestas a la pregunta hipotética '' ¿Si le dieron un par de precios, 
cuál de los dos paquetes de aceitunas comprarías? "fue probada usando un dentro-participantes 
experimento. En este contexto, los participantes tenían que responder a una serie de 
escenarios/combinaciones de precios. Una tabla de quince (15) diferentes pares de precios-
escenarios fue dado a ellos y tuvieron que elegir para cada precio-escenario cuál de los dos 
productos estaban dispuestos a comprar. En cada escenario, el precio de las aceitunas orgánicas 
toma un valor diferente que va desde abajo hasta bastante por encima del precio de los 
productos convencionales. El precio de los últimos se mantiene en línea con el precio en lo que 
el producto se vende realmente en el mercado minorista. En la etapa de la sesión de DAP real, 
se les dieron a los participantes una dotación de 5 € parte de la cual, como lo han sido instruidos, 
se deberían gastar para comprar uno de los dos paquetes de aceitunas disponibles.  
A lo largo de la historia económica, había la percepción que la Economía no es una 
ciencia experimental, pero durante las últimas décadas los experimentos se han convertido en 
uno de los métodos preferidos de investigación, en particular en el campo de la teoría de los 
juegos y en lo de la economía de comportamiento. El motivo de adoptar la metodología 
experimental es porque permite el estudio controlado de entornos estratégicos interactivos por 
sujetos. Los participantes de los experimentos son voluntarios y toman decisiones siguiendo las 
instrucciones de cada escenario económico, es decir siguiendo las normas creadas por el 
experimentalista. Las decisiones de los sujetos forman la base de datos que se utilizan para 
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obtener los resultados y las respuestas en las hipótesis que están puestas en prueba en cada 
experimento y para desarrollar varias conclusiones sobre las teorías económicas. Los 
participantes son incentivados monetariamente o con productos actuales (como por ejemplo en 
el tercero experimento), dependiendo de sus decisiones.  
Todos los datos aquí utilizados son recopilaciones extraídas de varios experimentos, en 
los que los sujetos eran estudiantes de las ramas de ingeniería y de psicología. Cabe mencionar 
que dichas ramas han elegido porque los estudiantes no tienes conocimientos de teoría 
económica y de teoría de juegos y por esta razón sus reacciones y sus respuestas son 
imparciales.  
El software estadístico para el análisis de datos ha sido principalmente el SPSS, aunque 
también nos hemos apoyado en otros programas informáticos como Stata. En el análisis de 
datos procedemos, en primer lugar, a la descripción de las variables del conjunto de datos objeto 
de estudio. Obtenemos de esta manera unas primeras conclusiones sobre las características de 
dicho conjunto, a partir de un estudio estadístico descriptivo apoyado con histogramas, gráficos 
de distribución acumulada o temporales. En segundo lugar, y dada la naturaleza de la muestra, 
calculamos test no paramétricos, como Mann-Whitney, Wilcoxon, Kolmogorov-Smirnov o 
modelos probit. Los test en los que se rechaza la correspondiente hipótesis nula al nivel de 
significación del 10%, 5% y 1% están señalados en las tablas con *, ** y ***, respectivamente.  
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1. Cross-Gender Interaction and Communication in 
Ultimatum Games3 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we focus on bargaining within male–female pairs, the most pervasive partnership 
in humankind since prehistory. We analyze data from an ultimatum game experiment played 
by subjects of different genders, and parallel to this, we introduce a one-way communication 
protocol according to which the responders can send short messages to the proposers after 
making their decisions. The analysis shows that gender and message effects exist and that males 
can bargain more effectively.  
Keywords: ultimatum game, gender effect, message effect, communication, negotiation, 
bargaining 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Partnerships between a male and a female within a household are the most ancient and most 
pervasive type of partnership among humans. Pairs of men and women forming families 
cooperate and negotiate on a daily basis. Economic self-interest plays an important role in intra-
family gender relations; as Agarwal (1997) states, bargaining is part of everyday life for a 
couple and occurs when the partners have different preferences and needs. Of course, there are 
restrictions on the bargaining ability of the two partners. For example, in some countries, 
because of social perceptions, women are considered to be inferior to men and this strongly 
affects their bargaining power. In these countries, women have to negotiate on a daily basis in 
order to gain something that for men is considered as granted. Within-household bargaining 
plays a major role in the social life of both genders because it can strongly define the ability to 
bargain in the society in general and simultaneously determines someone’s bargaining power.  
The majority of papers on within-household bargaining focus on women’s bargaining 
power and its determinants. In this paper, we study the bargaining ability of both genders. In 
the literature, it is usually assumed that men have everything that they want in a relationship 
and scarcely need to bargain. On the other hand, women are presented as being in an inferior 
position; thus, they have to bargain very often. What happens when men have to bargain too? 
                                                          
3 This paper was published as “Georgantzís, N., Parasyri, D., & Tsagarakis, K. (2016). Inter-gender 
interaction and communication in ultimatum games. Applied Economics Letters, 1-5. doi: 
10.1080/13504851.2016.1237725” 
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Do they achieve their goal or are women are better at that, putatively being more experienced 
in bargaining? We will try to provide evidence consistent with the possible answers.  
The sense of conflict is written in the genes of human beings. From prehistory until modern 
times, the coexistence of the two genders has provoked different and remarkable results, from 
epic battles to epic loves. These facts state that the symbiosis of genders is far from harmonious. 
That is because, as Paul Seabright (2012) says in his book The War of the Sexes, human beings 
are the most cooperative species on earth. Cooperation by no means implies the absence of 
conflict; on the contrary, it imposes it. Many observers provide evidence that sexual conflict is 
a by-product of our civilization. Conflict does not always imply that there are opposing interests 
within a male–female partnership. It implies that the partners’ interests are not alienated 
completely or simply that both partners believe that they should be the leader in one situation 
or another. 
However, in order for the synergies between a man’s and a woman’s abilities to be achieved 
in the context of a traditional household, a need emerges for the two partners to negotiate and 
agree on the way in which different outcomes are reached and the shares of the benefits obtained 
are divided. They have to understand that by cooperating they have something really important 
to gain: that is, a partnership that maximizes the utility of both partners. Metaphorically, this 
situation resembles a UG with agents from different genders representing the negotiating 
parties. In this paper, we will focus on an ultimatum game between different genders, giving 
the responders the possibility to send a short message to the proposers expressing their feelings 
about the offer they received after submitting their decision.  
As Manser and Brown (1980) and Pollak (2005) mention in their studies, in a relationship, 
independently of whether it is under the concept of a marriage or not, the couple tries to 
maximize a utility function that will maximize their utility under the utility possibility frontier. 
In our study, this frontier is the amount of money given to one of the two partners in each pair 
of players. These pairs can be considered as simulations of non-married couples, the members 
of which have an independent utility function and are called to bargain between each other in 
order to maximize their personal utility. In this scenario, the decision process in our UG 
experiment can be defined as one through which the two partners try to reach a combination of 
utilities located on the utility possibility frontier and through which they must decide on the 
allocation of resources and the distribution of gains. In our study, this utility frontier is defined 
by the 20 euros offered to the proposer as non-labor income. Any combination that maximizes 
both utilities and at the same time satisfies the utility frontier will lead to acceptance. If the 
responder is not satisfied with the offer received, meaning that he is not maximizing his utility, 
he will reject it and as a result no agreement can be reached. The agreed combination is Pareto 
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efficient because, as described by Doss (2013), the outcome of the bargaining process is one in 
which no one could ameliorate his position without making someone else in the household 
worse off. Our experiment approaches a type of housekeeping allowance system as presented 
in Jan Pahl’s (1995) study. Pahl defines this system as one in which the husband gives money 
to his wife for housekeeping expenses and he keeps the rest.  
The behavior of subjects in the economic experiments depends, among other things, on 
their gender and consequently on the risk preferences of each gender.4 Concerning the role of 
gender in the ultimatum game, Eckel and Grossman (2001) found that women appeared to be 
indifferent concerning the gender of the other player and that they were more generous than 
men. In the one-shot ultimatum game experiment conducted by Solnick (2001), the offers made 
to female players by both sexes were lower and the responders of both sexes intended to accept 
lower offers when facing female proposers.  
The majority of the experimenters who have chosen to study gender differences in 
ultimatum bargaining use gender in combination with other factors, such as risk preferences or 
altruistic behavior, which have been observed in former studies. Our research differs from other 
similar studies that use sessions with pairs of the same and different genders, because we focus 
on the gender differences emerging when players are faced with the opposite gender. 
Furthermore, the introduction of communication between players in combination with the 
above structure makes this design unique given the fact that very few bargaining experiments 
have been conducted for this scenario. 
Pollak (2005), in his study, states that the major problem with the studies that use 
observed differences across couples in the control of non-labor income is located in the 
assumption that this income is exogenous. That happens because many aspects can affect the 
proportion of the income controlled by the wife or the husband. As a solution to this problem, 
he proposes a controlled experiment that will provide additional resources to husbands in some 
families and to wives in others. That is exactly the structure of our experiment if we can assume 
that the pairs of our research represent bargaining families. 
Many studies provide evidence that men are more risk loving than women (for example 
Croson & Gneezy, 2009). As García-Gallego et al. (2008 and 2012) state, although we cannot 
reach a unanimous opinion concerning gender effects in competitive environments, women 
appear to be more risk averse, they tend to reject offers more often and they tend to make lower 
                                                          
4  Croson and Buchan (1999) and Eckel et al. (2008) found that men and women behave less differently 
in a risk-free environment, comparing evidence from experiments with and without risk-related gender 
differences in bargaining behavior. 
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offers. Furthermore, in the same study, the authors reject the hypothesis that gender effects in 
an ultimatum game are due to differences in risk attitudes.  
In the majority of the papers involving communication between players, it was found that 
the knowledge of the feelings of the players strongly affects the behavior of the participants. In 
an experiment conducted by Andersson et al. (2010), in which the proposer had the opportunity 
to communicate with the responder and in which they examined the persuasion effects in 
experimental ultimatum games, they found that the pay-off of the proposers increased when 
they had the opportunity to communicate with the responders by sending short messages before 
making their decision. In the same study, it was observed that players who sent more persuasive 
messages received higher pay-offs. In experiments conducted by Xiao and Houser (2005 and 
2009), in which the responders had the opportunity to send a short message along with their 
decision, the researchers observed that the rates of rejection of unfair offers were signiﬁcantly 
lower, but that we cannot know the real emotion behind any of the messages. This opinion has 
a point because we can never be sure about the thoughts of the participants. In our experiment, 
we chose messages as a method of communication in order to ensure privacy and because verbal 
or eye contact can bias the results.5 Several researchers have found that it is preferable to hold 
uncomfortable discussions (such as demanding money or expressing bad feelings about 
something) over the telephone or by short messages rather than in person because it reduces the 
effort that has to be invested in mastering feelings. We studied the contents of messages and 
classified them according to their purpose. The majority of the players chose to communicate 
and their main purpose was to demand a specific amount of money and to convince their partner 
to increase the offer. They countenanced the increases and expressed their dissatisfaction when 
they failed to happen. Additionally, we saw the impact that each message had on the offer and 
the decision in the subsequent round.  
We chose to insert communication into our experiment because we wanted to compare the 
changes, if any, it produces in the subjects’ behavior between the pre- and the post-message 
stage. Such an experiment was performed by Rankin (2003), who states that when responders 
had the capability to send messages, this fact led to lower offers, higher rejection rates and as 
consequence lower pay-offs. In our experiment, we attained similar results but only for female 
subjects. The behavior of the subjects changed during the experiment because they tried to 
adapt their decisions in the attempt to predict the next move of the other player. As Winter and 
Zamir (1997) state in their book, the proposers adapt their offers to the responders’ rejection 
and the responders adapt their rejections to the proposers’ behavior.  
                                                          
5 As Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) found in their experiment, knowing that someone is angry does 
not produce the same level of shame as facing the angry person or even having to read angry messages. 
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By expressing an emotion that makes the receiver feel selfish or guilty about his offer, as 
stated by Houser (2011), the senders of the messages managed to change the receivers’ behavior 
and as a consequence receive larger amounts of money, at the same time as reducing the 
rejection rate. Several psychologists have studied emotions and the meaning of different 
emotional expressions. If the responder in a UG is motivated by envy, he will probably reject 
an offer, and if he is motivated by indignation, he will feel pleasure as a result of this rejection. 
Elster (1998), in his study, shows that a feeling of indignation can be a feeling of envy in 
disguise and the dynamics of those emotions cannot be reflected in simple cost– benefit models. 
 
1.2 Experimental Design and Results 
 
In the literature, we can find plenty of ultimatum game experiments that focus on 
gender differences, using communication. In some of them, pre-play communication is used, 
while in other, like ours, researchers use post-decision communication. Pre-play 
communication has a clear strategic objective, which is to convince the other player to act in a 
favorable way. On the other hand, post-play communication is a way to send a signal about 
what the responder expects the proposer to do in subsequent periods and has a clear objective 
of influencing the proposer’s forthcoming offers. Without the ability to disentangle these two 
effects, we use post-decision communication, which has been studied much less in the literature 
so far. The results reported here were obtained from fourteen sessions of the ultimatum game 
with sixty periods each and the subjects were recruited among the students of the School of 
Engineering at the Democritus University of Thrace. Of the fourteen sessions, ten had eight 
participants and the remaining four had six participants. The experiment was conducted at the 
Business & Environmental Technology Economics (BETECO) laboratory of the Department 
of Environmental Engineering in Thrace, Greece.  
In every session, the subjects were assigned the role of proposer or responder according 
to their gender. All the subjects of the same gender had the same role in the experiment. Of the 
104 subjects participating in the experiment, 50% were male and 50% were female. Common 
written instructions were handed to them.6  The subjects were paired once for the whole session, 
and all the subjects were in the same room but unaware of the subject with whom they were 
bargaining. The experiment was designed and executed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 
2007). In each period, the proposer’s task was to place an offer of €X, which could be any 
amount between €0 and €20, in steps of €0.1. Random proposer–responder pairs were formed 
within fixed, independent, matching groups. These groups were stable across all the periods of 
                                                          
6 Instructions translated from Greek are provided in the appendix. 
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the experiment. A responder who was randomly chosen to be matched with a proposer received 
an offer and was called to accept or reject it. In the case of acceptance, the responder gained €X 
and the proposer €20-Χ. Otherwise, they both earned nothing. In order to prevent cumulative 
wealth effects, the subjects were paid according to their earnings in one period, which was 
randomly selected at the end of the session.7 Furthermore, because of the limited assets, only 
80% of the subjects of each session were paid and they were randomly selected at the end of 
each session. This was announced to all the participants at the beginning of the experiment.  
In each session, for 30 rounds of the game, the female subjects were given the role of 
proposer, and for the remaining 30 rounds, they changed their role and became responders. 
Each session consisted of 4 parts according to the role of each gender in the game and the 
presence or absence of communication. The structure was the following. There were 15 rounds 
in which the female subjects had the role of proposer in a repeated ultimatum game without 
communication. For another 15 rounds, the female subjects remained in the role of proposer 
but now they received a message from the male responders after the decision to accept or reject 
their offer. The proposers were not allowed to respond to the message sent by the responders. 
Secrecy was guaranteed concerning the content of the communication among the members of 
each group. For 15 rounds, the male subjects became the proposers while the female responders 
sent them a message, and for the remaining 15 rounds, the male subjects were proposers in a 
repeated ultimatum game without communication. In order to avoid ordering effects, the 
subjects were randomly entered in the above sub-sessions. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 present the mean 
values of the proposed amounts of money, the earnings of the proposers and responders 
calculated from successful transactions and the percentage of accepted offers by subject role 
and gender. In the whole data set, there were no observed offers equal to zero. Furthermore, in 
the analysis, we took into consideration that the offer and decision in a certain period for each 
subject are a function of the previous offers and decisions because fixed pairs bring history into 
play for all the periods after period 1.  
 
Table 1.1: Mean values of offers, earnings and acceptance frequencies with male proposers  
Offers Proposer earnings Responder earnings Acceptance 
Without message 9.16 10.11 9.88 82.94% 
With message 8.73 10.05 9.93 72.05% 
Overall 8.95 10.08 9.90 77.50% 
 
 
                                                          
7 Rankin (2003) followed the same strategy regarding payments.  
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Table 1.2: Mean values of offers, earnings and acceptance frequencies with female proposers  
Offers Proposer earnings Responder earnings Acceptance 
Without message 7.62 11.54 8.45 67.80% 
With message 9.11 10.25 9.84 75.64% 
Overall 8.37 10.89 9.15 71.72% 
 
1.2.1 Gender Effects 
Possible gender effects were checked for the offers and earnings of the subjects in sub-
sessions with and without communication and for both roles. The Mann–Whitney U two-tailed 
test was performed for this purpose. 
1.2.1.1 Result 1: The gender effect on offers  
In the sub-sessions without messages, the amounts offered by male subjects were 
16.8% higher than those offered by female subjects (p<0.001). In the sub-sessions with 
messages, the amounts offered by female subjects were 4.1% higher than those offered by male 
subjects. This is statistically significant (p=0.052) for the confidence level of 5%. From the 
above, we can say that gender plays a role in the offered amounts in both sub-sessions with and 
sub-sessions without communication. 
1.2.1.2 Result 2: The gender effect on earnings in sub-sessions without communication 
 We studied earnings by gender in both sub-sessions, with and without communication, 
for the two roles of the subjects. The earnings were calculated only from the successful 
transactions. We found that in the sub-sessions without messages, female proposers earned 
more than male proposers (p<0.001). On the contrary, in the sub-sessions with messages, there 
is no statistically significant difference in the earnings for the two genders in the role of 
proposer (p=0.565).  
When they had the role of responder, in the sub-sessions without communication, male 
subjects gained more money than female subjects (p<0.001). In those with messages, there is 
no statistically significant difference in the earnings for the two genders (p=0.540). These 
earnings were calculated, as above, from the successful transactions in the experiment. These 
findings indicate that gender plays a role in the pay-offs of the subjects, independently of their 
role, only when they play a UG without communication.  
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Figure 1.1 Gender and message effects in offers and proposer profits (the arrow directions indicate 
statistically significant increases in the corresponding amounts)   
1.2.2 Message effects  
Possible message effects were checked for the offered amounts and for the earnings of 
the subjects in sub-sessions with and without communication and for both roles. The Wilcoxon 
test was performed for this purpose. 
1.2.2.1 Result 3: The messages had different effects on the offers of each gender 
By performing an analysis of the possible message effects, we wanted to find out 
whether the offered amount increased ex ante, meaning that the messages do not affect the 
beliefs of proposers concerning the responders’ minimum acceptable offers, or whether 
proposers raise their offers ex post, after having observed the responders’ behavior in the 
message sub-sessions. 
In sessions in which the female subjects were proposers, there is a statistically 
significant increase in offers in the message sub-sessions (p<0.001). From Table 1.2, we can 
see that there is an increase of €1.49 in the offers in the sub-sessions with messages. On the 
contrary, in the rounds in which men had the role of proposer, there is a decrease of €0.43 in 
the amounts offered in the sub-sessions with messages (p=0.007). In order to guarantee that the 
differences in offers across pre- and post-message sub-sessions are not due to other dynamics, 
like learning, we also tested and rejected, by analyzing the string of offers of each subject, the 
existence of learning behavior across the sub-sessions of the experiment.  
1.2.2.2 Result 4: A decrease in the proposer’s earnings in message sub-sessions when the 
proposer was a female subject 
 
 
29 
 
In sessions in which female subjects had the role of the proposer, their earnings, 
calculated from the successful transactions, decreased by 11.17% in the sub-sessions with 
messages (p<0.001). On the contrary, when testing the difference in the earnings of male 
subjects, in the sub-sessions in which they had the role of proposer in the game, the decrease of 
0.5% in their earnings presented in Table 1.2 is not statistically significant (p=0.873). These 
results make sense in both cases if combined with the differences in offers and acceptance 
percentages.  
In the sub-sessions with female proposers, an increase in offers after receiving a 
message led to an increase in the percentage of acceptance, an increase in the earnings of the 
responders and a decrease in the earnings of the proposers. In the cases in which males were 
proposers, a decrease in offers after receiving a message led, as expected, to a decrease in the 
percentage of acceptances, but the difference between proposer and responder earnings is not 
statistically significant (Mann–Whitney test for the responders’ earnings: p=0.858).8 
1.2.2.3 Result 5: The messages had a positive effect on the responders’ average earnings 
when males had the role of responder, increasing their earnings 
We tested the differences in proposers’ and responders’ earnings calculated from 
successful transactions across the pre- and post-communication periods. Comparing the data of 
the sub-sessions, we find that the messages sent by male subjects increased their earnings 
(p<0.001). On the contrary, in sub-sessions in which messages were sent by females, we find 
that this fact does not affect their earnings significantly (p=0.858).  
1.2.2.4 Result 6: Female responders failed to convince male proposers to give them the 
amount of money they demanded  
From the evaluation of the messages sent by each gender, as described in the 
introduction, we find that female subjects failed to convince male proposers to offer them their 
desired amount of money. This led to a decrease in the acceptance percentage in the message 
sub-sessions when the female players were the responders. The messages of female subjects 
showed that they had no strategy about the level of acceptable offers, behavior that led them to 
accept smaller amounts than requested in many cases. The male proposers showed behavior 
that tended to ignore the requests of the female subjects. On the other hand, when males were 
sending messages, they almost always received their desired amount of money. That fact led to 
an increase in the acceptance percentage by 7.8%. 
                                                          
8 For those effects, see Figure 1.1. 
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1.2.2.5 Result 7: Being female and having the opportunity to send messages decrease the 
willingness to accept an offer 
In order to analyze an acceptance or rejection decision with respect to gender and the 
presence of messages, we use the following Probit model, in which the dependent variable is 
the decision of the participants and takes the value 1 for acceptance and the value 0 for 
rejection.9 Table 1.3 displays the results.  
 
Table1.3: Probit results for the probability of acceptance 
Decision Coefficient Est. 
Offer 0.14598** 
Female 0.14924* 
Message 0.192** 
Female × Message -0.2083* 
Constant -0.6785 
Observations Pseudo R2 0.1282 
Prob>chi2 <0.001 
Notes: Offer: offered amount of money, Female: 1 for female subjects and 0 for male subjects, Message: 
1 for the presence of messages and 0 for the absence of messages, Female × Message: dummy product 
of gender and message, Significance: **1%, *5% 
 
Interpreting this table, we reach the following results: 
1. An increase in offers will increase the probability of acceptance (P>|z|<0.001). 
2. Being a female increases the probability of accepting an offer (P>|z|=0.045). 
3. The presence of post-decision messages increases the probability of accepting an offer 
(P>|z|=0.007). 
4. Being a female participant in the sub-sessions with messages decreases the probability 
of accepting an offer (P>|z|=0.043). 
 
1.3 Conclusions 
 
Human life is founded on exchange. Many centuries of interaction and evolution within 
the roles of husband and wife have not sorted out the existence of conflicts, nor have they led 
to an ability to communicate in a way that would minimize the conflict. Bargaining processes 
are dominant in the majority of actions in modern societies. The existence and stability of those 
processes between men and women are a fundamental building block. In fact, this type of 
negotiation, in its different forms and occasions of occurrence, determine the outcome of 
several social processes, including the level of development in the society as a whole. In this 
                                                          
9Andreou et al. (2011) used the same model in order to examine the willingness to accept a given wage. 
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paper, we use the well-known set-up of ultimatum bargaining to establish some interesting 
facts, focusing on the role of post-decision communication as a means of informing the other 
party of one’s emotions following a given outcome.  
The analysis shows that gender does play a role in the amount of money offered in both 
sub-sessions. Male subjects, after reading the messages, tend to offer more, but on the other 
hand, females are more generous in the sub-sessions with communication. There is also a 
message effect, which affects the level of offers. Females are most prone to changing their 
attitude and increasing their offers when knowing the intensions and wishes of the other player. 
However, they rely on their capability to convince males to offer them the desired amount of 
money in the communication sub-sessions and do not hesitate to decline undesired offers. From 
this, it is evident that the females in our experiment negotiate less aggressively than the males. 
The answer to the question that we posed in the introduction, wondering whether women, who 
are more experienced in bargaining, negotiate better than men, is that there is no evidence to 
prove that. This result supports the theory that women run away from negotiation, action that 
may be based not just on inhibition but also on a shrewd assessment of how their behavior will 
be viewed by others.  
The overall effect of the presence of communication is positive for male subjects, 
increasing their profits and their willingness to accept an offer. Studies have shown that men 
negotiate harder with women than they do with other men, whether through prejudice, habit or 
conscious coordination.  
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1.4 Appendix: Instructions for the Subjects (Translated from Greek) 
 
Thank you for your participation in this experiment. The goal of this experiment is to study the 
economic behavior of people, under specific economic conditions. The instructions are very 
easy and if you follow them carefully, there is a chance of winning an amount of money in a 
confidential way; given the fact that none of the other participants will know the amount of 
money you have gained. In this experiment, there are no correct or incorrect answers. However, 
bear in mind that your decisions will affect the amount of money that will be gained by both 
you and the participant with whom you will be paired anonymously and randomly. You can 
ask me questions if you have any doubts about the process of the experiment by raising your 
hand. The time of the experiment is not infinite, so please try to respect the given timeline in 
each stage of the experiment. 
1. In order to ensure anonymity and confidentiality, a random number, a yellow tag, will 
be given to you at the beginning of the experiment. 
2. There are two types of players: the players of type A and the players of type B. You 
will know your type of player from the beginning of the experiment. All the players 
with the same gender will have the same role. This role, at some point during the 
experiment, will change suddenly and simultaneously for all the players of the same 
gender.  
3. Each player of type A will be matched randomly with a player of type B during the 
experiment. The identity of the participant with whom you will be matched will be 
completely unknown to you before, during and after the experiment. You will know 
only his/her gender. The pairs of the players will not change for the duration of the 
experiment. 
4. The experiment will have 60 rounds. 
5. Instructions for player type A: 
In this experiment, you will be a player of type A. You and another player, with whom 
you will be matched randomly, a player of type B, will have the chance to win an 
amount of money. The decision-making procedure will be the following.  
The player of type A (this is you) will offer an amount X from a total of €20 to the 
player of type B. The offers can be any amount between €0 and €20 in steps of €0.10 
(it is accepted that there will be integer amounts and subdivisions of them, e.g. €2, €4, 
€5.10 and €13.20 but not €3.25 and €15.17). If the player of type B accepts the offer, 
he or she will gain €X and you will gain €(20-X). If he or she rejects the offer, neither 
of the two players will gain money in this round. This procedure will be repeated for 
60 rounds. 
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6. Instructions for player type B: 
In this experiment, you will be a player of the type B. You and another player, with 
whom you will be matched randomly, a player of type A, will have the chance to win 
an amount of money. The decision-making procedure will be the following.  
The player of type A will offer an amount X from a total of €20 to the player of type B 
(this is you). The offers can be any amount between €0 and €20 in steps of €0.10 (it is 
accepted that there will be integer amounts and subdivisions of them, e.g. €2, €4, €5.10 
and €13.20, but not €3.25 and €15.17). You have to decide whether to accept or reject 
this offer. If you accept the offer, you will gain €X and the player of type A will gain 
€(20-X). If you reject the offer, neither of the two players will gain money in this round. 
This procedure will be repeated for 60 rounds. 
 
Additional instructions for player type B: 
At some point during the experiment, you will have the possibility but you will not be 
obliged to send a short confidential message to the player of type A with whom you 
have been matched.   
7. At the end of the experiment, 80% of you will receive an amount of money according 
to your decisions during the experiment in a confidential and private way. The players 
who will be paid will be chosen randomly. The amount of money that you will receive 
will be the amount each player has gained during a round of the experiment. This round 
will be chosen randomly and will be different for different players (even if the profits 
were zero in the chosen round for this player). 
8. In order to be sure that you have completely understood the procedure, please answer 
the following questions, based on the experiment in which you will participate. If you 
have any doubts, please do not hesitate to ask me questions by raising your hand. 
Questionnaire 
 
a) If the player of type A offers €4 to the player of type B and the player B accepts: 
 
What is the amount of money the player of type A has gained in this 
round?........................ 
What is the amount of money the player of type B has gained in this 
round?........................ 
 
b) If the player of type B rejects the offer of player A: 
 
 
36 
 
 
What is the amount of money the player of type A has gained in this 
round?........................ 
What is the amount of money the player of type B has gained in this 
round?........................ 
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2. Economics of “yuck” and “yum”: willingness to 
consume, and pay, for food cultivated with recycled 
water 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we describe an experiment testing the effect of the descriptor “irrigated with 
recycled water” on the level of preference and willingness to pay for food products. Each 
participant in the experiment was asked to taste raisins from two nearly identical professionally 
designed and printed boxes. The only difference between the boxes (and their contents) was the 
descriptor of the water with which the fruits were putatively irrigated: one box indicated 
“irrigated with freshwater” while the other box indicated that the vineyard where the raisins 
were produced was irrigated with recycled water. The results of the experiment are interpreted 
as being consistent in general with the so-called “yuck factor,” that is, that the descriptor 
“recycled water” elicits disgust or inhibits appetite, thus reducing preference for or willingness 
to pay the product so described; however, a minority of participants actually preferred the 
product designated as recycled, and these individuals were more likely to purchase and to pay 
more for such earth-friendly goods. 
Keywords: Raisins; yuck factor; yum factor; irrigation; willingness to pay; willingness 
to buy; recycled water  
JELClassification Codes: C12; C91; 3290 
PsycINFO classification: 3660; 4070 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The intensive rise in agricultural production of the last decades has contributed in the 
exploitation of water resources. Moreover, the modern way of life has resulted in the production 
of large wastewater flow routes. Consequently, in many regions with water scarcity, effluents 
from wastewater treatment facilities (recycled water) are reused for the irrigation of agricultural 
crops (Angelakis et al., 1999; Anderson, 2003; Paranychianakis et al., 2006). Water recycling, 
particularly for irrigation, has been developed as an alternative source of water in order to save 
freshwater and eliminate water shortages, to increase the irrigated land and at the same time to 
meet the required water quality criteria to eliminate ecological and public health risks 
(Paranychianakis et al., 2015). Furthermore, recycled water contains essential nutrients that 
might stimulate growth and increase yield (Klein et al., 2000; Maurer et al., 1995). However, 
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during the irrigation with recycled water, the nutrients’ concentrations should be carefully 
monitored to prevent harmful effects on plant performance (Magesan et al., 1998) or to the 
environment. Recycled water is produced in different qualities based on level of treatment, with 
each quality level being appropriate only for a specific range of uses (i.e. for restricted 
irrigation, unrestricted irrigation, industrial use, landscape irrigation, etc.; Tsagarakis et al., 
2004). The levels of treatment refer mainly to the recycled water concentrations in pathogens, 
nutrients and organic matter (i.e. primary secondary and advanced treatment). 
Recycled water will not be used, and will not be permitted, to replace the conventional 
water sources for irrigation, unless all the standards imposed by the legislation are met (Salgot 
et al., 2003; Gerba and Rose, 2003). There is a continuous update and optimization of water 
reuse criteria (Blumenthal et al., 2000; World Health Organization (WHO), 2006; Queensland 
Government, 2008; Paranychianakis et al., 2015) by individual states and agencies in order to 
ensure that reused water reaches the standards of high quality and safety. But despite all these 
safety guidelines, there is evidence of existence of the so called “yuck factor” when people taste 
food whose origin is deemed to be from “impure sources” or food  for which previously impure 
sources were used  in production, such as recycled water coming from domestic wastewater 
treatment (Po et al., 2005). 
In the marketing field, public acceptance is the main obstacle in the use of recycled 
water or in the consumption of agricultural products irrigated with recycled water. Persuading 
people to use recycled water has proved to be very difficult and the public acceptance of the 
water remains still the principal challenge in the successful implementation to reuse schemes 
(Nancarrow et al., 2008). Although some members of the general community are willing to use 
recycled water, according to some researches (e.g. Water Corporation of WA 2003; Kaercher 
et al., 2003; Menegaki et al., 2009), the majority of them hesitate to do so. As Tsagarakis et al. 
(2007) have shown, it is more difficult to establish the acceptance of recycled water itself than 
of recycled water-based products such as foodstuffs. While the so called “yuck factor,” (e.g., 
Menegaki et al., 2009) exists in the literature since the 1970s, little progress has been made in 
research aimed at exploring the connection between the use of recycled water and the disgust-
related avoidance to consume products which incorporate in their production process this kind 
of water. There is, however, evidence that the closer the recycled water to human contact or 
ingestion is, the less people are likely to utilize it (Australian Research Centre for Water in 
Society, 2002).  
Another factor that has to be investigated is the willingness to pay for recycled water 
or for food products for which recycled water has been used during the production process. It 
has been found that, as the people get more and better information about the recycled water and 
the products irrigated from it, the more they are willing to pay for recycled water and its by-
products (Tsagarakis and Georgantzís, 2003).  
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Furthermore, it has been observed that education levels and levels of environmental 
awareness are positively correlated with willingness to pay for products irrigated with recycled 
water (Genius et al., 2005; Menegaki et al., 2007; Tziakis et al., 2009). But at the same time, in 
other studies there is evidence that people are eager to pay for recycled water only in cases in 
which there is  a scarcity of freshwater (e.g. Bakopoulou et al., 2010) or if they otherwise benefit 
from this action, e.g. by contingent reduction in  outdoor water restrictions (Dupont, 2013). 
Moreover, it has been reported that experienced users of treated water are willing to pay more 
money for it when they are aware of the fact that the production process is costly (Hurlimann, 
2009). To our knowledge, none of the published work on the relation between water quality 
descriptors and willingness to use or pay has involved the actual consumption of agricultural 
products irrigated with recycled water. In this study we addressed this issue. Specifically, we 
investigated the independent effect of water provenance descriptors (irrigated with “freshwater” 
or “recycled water”) on the evaluation and the willingness to pay for raisins. 
2. 2 Material and methods 
2.2.1. Experiment location and participants 
 
The experiment was conducted in two different academic departments with different 
curriculums and consequently different levels of knowledge on wastewater treatment as well 
as of relations between environment and behavior; at the Business & Environmental 
Technology Economics (BETECO) laboratory of the Department of Environmental 
Engineering at Democritus University of Thrace, and  at the Laboratory of Experimental and 
Applied Behavior Analysis of the Department of Psychology at Panteion University of Social 
and Political Sciences in Athens. The reason for selecting these two disciplines is to investigate 
potential differences from the recruited participants who do their studies in those two 
departments. The engineering students are mostly men and science/technology oriented, while 
the psychology students are mostly women and social science oriented. In both laboratories, 
indoor thermal comfort conditions and restricted noise levels were maintained. 
The sample consisted of 160 students (80 from each department) who responded to 
invitations to participate. The participants were informed that one box contained raisins 
irrigated with freshwater and the other box contained raisins irrigated with recycled water. This 
information was also presented on the boxes, which were otherwise identical. The two boxes 
in fact contained raisins from the same freshwater-irrigated source. The purpose was to 
determine if information concerning the water source alone (fresh or recycled water) was 
sufficient to alter the participants’ perception of the quality of agricultural products. 
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2.2.2. Experimental preparation 
In order to comply with the standards of the professional packaging, two different boxes were 
designed and created by a publishing firm. The boxes had information concerning the expiration 
date, the content product, the preservation conditions, the net weight (50 gr), the country of 
origin accompanied by a Greek flag, and full contact information (production region, telephone, 
fax and email address).  A plausible brand name was given (Kandylis Soultanina, which defines 
the place of origin of the product) and a trademark was designed. The opening and the bottom 
side of the pack had a printed photo of raisins. A photo of grapes was also printed on one side 
of the box. At the bottom, a facsimile barcode was inserted. The only difference between the 
two box types was that on one of them it was written, in large font, “Contains raisins produced 
from grapes irrigated with freshwater (here after called box Type FW) whereas the other box 
type indicated that it “Contains raisins produced from grapes irrigated with recycled water 
certified for irrigation (here after called box Type RW). Figure 2.1 shows the two different 
packages that were created for this experiment. Several hundred of them were produced. All 
raisins contained in boxes of both types were sourced from the Consortium of Cooperative 
Organizations of Soultanina of Crete. It was the highest quality product from the most recent 
raisin production, irrigated with freshwater. No matter the package type, the contents were 
identical in both “qualities” of raisins used in the experiment.  
2.2.3. Questionnaire design 
A structured questionnaire was designed expressly for the purpose of this experiment (see 
appendix). The questionnaire consisted of four parts. In the first part we asked the participants 
general questions about the raisins that they have tasted. We asked them if they like raisins in 
general, we investigated their preference level for the two sample types tasted, and we asked 
them to select the differences that they found, if any, between the two samples from a given list 
of potential differences. 
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Figure 2.1 The two different versions of packages (unfolded boxes before entered in the cutting 
machine) which we created for the experiment 
The second part of the questionnaire was designed to assess the participants’ 
willingness to buy and their willingness to pay for each “type” of raisins. The participants were 
then asked to indicate their certainty concerning their willingness to buy the raisins of the two 
boxes. Subsequently, the participants were asked to state the amount of money they were 
willing to pay in order to buy each of the “types.” A reasonable price of 0.5€ (keyed to current 
market value) was provided as an anchor value for the other Type; for example: 
 
From Cretan vineyards 
irrigated with pure 
freshwater (Type FW) 
From Cretan vineyards 
irrigated with recycled 
water certified for 
irrigation (Type RW) 
 
 
42 
 
“If this box of raisins with 50 gr weight derived from grapes irrigated with freshwater costs 
0.50 € how much would you be willing to pay to buy an identical box of raisins from grapes 
irrigated with recycled water certified for irrigation?” 
The third part of the questionnaire collected personal data of each participant such as 
gender, age and personal income. In a fourth part of the questionnaire in which the experimenter 
recorded the consumption (in grams) from each box.  
2.2.4. Procedure  
When the participant entered the laboratory he/she was instructed to sit down on a specific desk. 
Then written instructions were provided and read by the experimenter, as follows: 
“In this experiment you will be asked to taste two samples of raisins. You will be given two 
different boxes which contain raisins. On each of them is printed the content origin. The one of 
the two boxes contains raisins originated from Cretan vineyards irrigated with freshwater, 
while the other one contains raisins originated from Cretan vineyards irrigated with recycled 
water certified for irrigation. From each sample you can try as many raisins as you like without 
any restriction on the amount of consumption. Once the tasting has been finished you will be 
asked to complete a questionnaire in which we inquire your opinion about the raisins you've 
tasted.” 
Then, the experimenter provided verbal information to the participants about the 
definition, the origin and the purification process of the certified recycled water so all 
participants had the minimum required information, in order to participate in this experiment. 
Afterwards, the participant was instructed to taste from the first box, and then from the second 
box. The sequence of the boxes (Type FW and RW) was different across participants in order 
to avoid possible ordering effects in participants’ preference and consumption levels. After 
finishing the tasting process, the participant was instructed to respond to a short questionnaire, 
concerning among other issues, his/her opinion about the taste, appearance, quality and 
differences of the two “types.” Furthermore, the participant’s willingness to buy and to pay for 
raisins of the same quality as that were in each box was recorded. Then the participant was 
debriefed and dismissed. Afterwards, the experimenter weighed the two pre-weighed boxes in 
order to record the quantity that had been consumed from each box. 
2.2.5. Hypotheses tested 
A number of hypotheses (Hi, i=1,…8) were tested. The hypotheses were that, although the 
samples are of identical quality, the source information (FW-RW) would affect the participants’ 
judgment in a manner consistent with the so-called “yuck factor”.  
H1: The participants like more the raisins of Type FW (although the two samples are the same) 
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H2: The participants state difference in the taste between the raisins of Type FW and those of 
Type RW. 
H3: The participants state difference in the color between the raisins of Type FW and those of 
Type RW. 
H4: The participants state difference in the general appearance between the raisins of Type 
FW and those of Type RW. 
H5: The participants state difference in the odor between the raisins of Type FW and those of 
Type RW. 
H6: There is a difference in the willingness to buy for the raisins of the two designations. 
H7: There is difference in the willingness to pay for the raisins of the two designations. 
H8: There is a difference in the consumption between the two types of raisins.  
 
2.3. Results 
2.3.1 Perceived difference between the different samples 
2.3.1.1. H1: Difference in “liking” level between raisin “types” 
The responses given to the question “did you like the raisins you have tasted” are reported in 
Figure 2.2. According to Wilcoxon signed ranks test on the responses, H1 was confirmed; that 
is, participants were significantly more likely to state that they like more the raisins of Type 
FW compared to the raisins of Type RW (ZW=2.911, p=0.004) (recall that in fact both raisins 
“types” were in fact the same product).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Difference in levels of “liking” the two types of raisins 
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2.3.1.2. H2-H5: Observed differences between the two raisin “types”  
A substantial majority of all participants (75.3%) observed at least one difference between the 
raisins of the two “types.” As shown in Figure 2.3, 66.1% of all participants stated that the two 
samples have different tastes (χ2=147.79, p<0.001), confirming H2, 20.9% stated that the two 
samples have difference in the appearance (χ2=33.539, p<0.001), confirming H3, and 14.3% of 
participants found a difference in the color (χ2=21.598, p<0.001), confirming H4. A further 
3.3% of participants stated that the two “types” of raisins smelled differently, but this 
observation was not statistically significant (χ2=3.253, p=0.070) so H5 is not supported by the 
present findings. 
 
Figure 2.3: Percentage of observed difference between the two raisin “types” 
 
2.3.2 Stated willingness to purchase for the different samples 
Participants’ responses on the questions “would you buy raisins irrigated with 
freshwater/recycled water” are reported in Figure 2.4. According to a Wilcoxon signed ranks 
test, the participants were more willing to buy raisins irrigated with freshwater (Type FW) than 
raisins labeled as irrigated with recycled water (Type RW) (ZW=3.957, p<0.001), supporting 
hypothesis H6. 
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Figure 2.4: Willingness to buy the raisins of the two samples 
2.3.3 Willingness to pay for the two “types” of raisins 
The descriptive statistics of the responses given concerning the willingness to pay for Type FW 
and Type RW raisins are given in Table 2.1. Analyses from the complete dataset are presented 
in the first pair of columns, whereas the second pair presents the same analyses after filtering 
for extreme positive scores. The bids are not normally distributed (Kolmogorov - Smirnov test, 
p<0.001) and the follow two different distributions. The bids for Type FW follow the beta 
distribution while the ones of Type RW are randomly distributed as they do not fit to any of the 
known types of distribution. The WTP values of more than 0.90€ are excluded, 0.90€ is the 
max of mean WTP+St.Dev. For the two samples, with the upper WTP being the max 
{0.55+0.35€, 0.57+0.21€}. Note that for the unfiltered findings, no significant differences were 
observed in willingness to pay for the two “types” of raisins; indeed, despite the fact that a large 
majority of participants had reported some form of inferiority in the quality of RW raisins and 
overall were less willing to purchase this time, on average participants were willing to pay more 
for RW raisins (.55€) when FW raisins cost .50 cents.  
Note, however, that the money the participants were willing to pay for purchasing 
raisins of Type RW with a FW anchor had a greater range (3-0=3€) compared to that for Type 
FW with a RW anchor (2.00-0.25=1.75€). There were participants who stated that they were 
unwilling to pay anything to buy raisins of Type RW (minimum amount in WTP for RW equals 
to zero) and others who were willing to pay five or six times the price of FW irrigated product 
(presumably individuals with high levels of environmental sensitivity). When extreme 
willingness to pay values are filtered, the WTP findings accord with the pattern of findings for 
the comparative quality (taste, appearance etc.) and the willingness to purchase data reported 
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above; that is, the participants were less willing to pay for raisins of identical quality when they 
were said to be cultivated with recycled water  (ZW=2.821, p=0.005).  
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics for willingness to pay for the two samples in Euros (€) 
 Unfiltered data Filtered for extreme scores 
Statistics WTP for RW 
(when FW 
0.50€) 
WTP for FW 
(when RW 
0.50€) 
WTP for RW 
(when FW 
0.50€) 
WTP for FW 
(when RW 
0.50€) 
N 160 160 143 148 
Mean 0.55 0.57 0.46 0.53 
Std. Deviation 0.35 0.21 0.14 0.12 
Mode 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Minimum 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.25 
25%  
Percentile 0.40 0.50 0.40 0.50 
Median 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
75% 
Percentile 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.60 
Maximum 3.00 2.00 0.90 0.90 
 
Willingness to pay was clearly differentiated with respect to self-reported consumer 
satisfaction with raisins said to be cultivated with either fresh or recycled water.  The “liking 
level difference” (LD) is operationally defined as the difference between the reported level of 
satisfaction or “liking” of Type FW and Type RW raisins (FW – RW = LD). A positive 
difference indicates that the participant liked more the raisins of Type FW; a negative difference 
indicates that the participants liked more the raisins of Type RW and a difference equal to zero 
indicates that the “liking” level of the two types was the same.   
In Table 2.2, the results from the Wilcoxon test indicate that in the cases in which there 
is a non-zero difference in the “liking” level of the two types of raisins, there is a statistically 
significant difference in the willingness to pay. When this difference in “liking” level is equal 
to zero, then the difference in the willingness to pay was not statistically significant. Hypothesis 
7 is thus confirmed in cases for which the “liking” level for FW and RW raisins was different.  
 
Table 2.2: Liking level difference and willingness to pay  
Liking level 
Difference 
N Median WTP 
Type   FW 
 Type   RW p value ZW 
LD>0 51 0.60 0.40 0.002 3.028 
LD<0 29 0.50 0.70 0.046 1.995 
LD=0 80 0.50 0.50 0.880 0.151 
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Respondents who stated that liked more raisins of Type RW were willing to pay more 
for them compared to raisins of type FW.  Respondents who stated that liked more raisins of 
Type FW were willing to pay more for them compared to raisins of type RW.   
2.3.4 Effect on the consumption 
 According to Wilcoxon signed ranks test, no statistically significant differences were observed 
in consumption (ZW=0.998, p=0.318), so the H8 is rejected. Furthermore, 77 of the participants 
(50%) consumed the same quantity of the two types, 49 of them (31.7%) consumed more from 
the Type FW while 28 (18.2%) consumed more from the Type RW.  
 
2.4. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The present study aimed to investigate whether the designation of an edible agricultural product 
as derived from recycled vs. freshwater alters willingness to consume and the willingness to 
pay for the products, in accord with the so-called “yuck factor,” that is, the disgust and rejection 
of objects known to have a history of contact with human waste. For this purpose we used 
identical products in two identical types of boxes, one denoted as “Irrigated with Recycled 
Water” and one “Irrigated with Pure Freshwater” and tested several hypotheses.  
The descriptor “Irrigated with Recycled Water” clearly affected the perception of the 
participants in this experiment. A substantial majority of participants discerned nonexistent 
differences in the taste, color or appearance of the two “types” of raisins; overall, raisins thought 
to be derived from freshwater sources were preferred, and when extreme scores were filtered, 
willingness to pay was also higher for the putative “freshwater” product. These findings are 
significant because, although several studies have indicated that irrigation with recycled water 
has no impact on the quality of agricultural products if the appropriate technology has been 
employed for the treatment of wastewater (Christou et al., 2014; Battilani et al., 2014; Prazeres 
et al., 2014; Li et al., 2014), consumer acceptance appears likely to be determined by 
descriptions of the very recent history of the water molecules used for crop irrigation. Overall, 
the direction of this effect is in accordance with the so-called “yuck” factor, that is, the irrational 
belief that water is permanently contaminated by any contact with waste material, despite the 
fact that in the closed system of our planet’s atmosphere, all water molecules will have 
contacted such material on a multitude of occasions. Furthermore, we found no statistically 
significant difference in the consumption level of the two types. We believe that respondents 
felt safe to consume raisins of type RW. However, it is probable that if we had put them to 
consume directly recycled water they would have observed difference in the consumption 
between the sample of fresh and recycled water. This work complements previous findings 
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about suitable labeling (Mellon and Tsagarakis, 2006; Menegaki et al. 2007) and working for 
encouraging recycled water use (Tsagarakis et al. 2007).  
A rather more surprising and encouraging outcome of the present experiment was the 
finding that the effect of the recycled water use designation on consumer’s judgment of product 
quality and value was not universally in accordance with the so-called “yuck” factor. A minority 
of participants found the raisins said to be cultivated with recycled water to be of superior 
quality, and these participants were both more willing to use and to pay more for products 
merely because they were generated in a manner that preserves the naturally-purified water 
supply. These participants express a bias in the valuation of products cultivated with earth-
friendly practices that would have to be described as a “yum” factor. This heartening individual 
variation in the effects of recycled edible product designations defines an important problem 
for applied behavioral science: how, precisely, do we get from “yuck” to “yum”?  
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2.5 Appendix 
 
Questionnaire 
GENERAL QUESTIONS 
1. Do you like eating raisins? 
Please choose only one from the following options 
☐ Not at all ☐ Somewhat ☐ About average ☐ A lot ☐ Very much 
2. Do you like the raisins that you have tasted from the first box? 
Please choose only one from the following options 
☐ Not at all ☐ Somewhat ☐ About average ☐ A lot ☐ Very much 
3. Do you like the raisins that you have tasted from the second box? 
Please choose only one from the following options  
☐ Not at all ☐ Somewhat ☐ About average ☐ A lot ☐ Very much 
4. Have you noticed a difference between the two samples? 
Check any that apply 
☐ There is no difference between the two samples 
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☐ There is a difference in their taste 
☐ There is a difference in the odor 
☐ There is a difference in the color 
☐ There is a difference in the appearance 
 
5. How many times per month do you consume products which contain raisins? 
 
 
WILLINGNESS TO BUY AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 
6 Would you buy raisins with similar quality to those contained in the first box? 
Please choose only one from the following options  
☐ Certainly no ☐ Probably no ☐ Probably yes ☐ Certainly yes 
7. Would you buy raisins with similar quality to those contained in the second box? 
Please choose only one from the following options  
☐ Certainly no ☐ Probably no ☐ Probably yes ☐ Certainly yes 
8. If this box of raisins with 50g weight derived from grapes irrigated with freshwater 
costs 0,50 € how much would you be willing to pay to buy an identical box of raisins 
from grapes irrigated with recycled water certified for irrigation? 
Please write your answer here:  
 
 
9. If this box of raisins with 50g weight derived from grapes irrigated with recycled 
water certified for irrigation costs 0,50 € how much would you be willing to pay to buy 
an identical box of raisins from grapes irrigated with clean water? 
Please write your answer here:   
 
PERSONAL DATA QUESTIONS 
10. Gender ☐ Male ☐ Female 
 
11. Age ……… 
 
12 Which is your monthly income? 
Please choose only one from the following options 
☐ <500€ ☐  500-700€ ☐ 700-1000€ ☐ >1000€ 
 
 
54 
 
 
DATA FILLED IN BY THE EXPERIMENTER 
Quantity of raisins consumed from the first box: 
Grams before the consumption………………………….. 
Grams after the consumption…………………… 
Quantity of raisins consumed from the second box: 
Grams before the consumption………………………….. 
Grams after the consumption…………………… 
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3. A comparative assessment of the Willingness to Pay 
between Organic and Conventional Products. Case 
Study: Table olives 
 
Abstract 
 
The present paper provides further insight on the consumers’ behavior by testing the effect of 
the descriptor “organic product” on the willingness to pay for agricultural products. First, 
following usual practices in marketing research, we acquire information on participants’ stated 
willingness to pay (WTP) for this descriptor (hypothetical part). Additionally, the same person 
participated in a real reward experiment designed to replicate the scenario valued in the 
hypothetical part. Our results show that regardless of the presence of the descriptor “organic” 
there is no statistically significant difference between the hypothetical and the real WTP, and 
that the revealed preferences are adequately predicted by the declared ones.  
Keywords: Consumer preferences; Experimental economics; Experimental preferences; 
Hypothetical preferences; Organic products; Willingness to pay 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The ongoing environmental awareness of the past two decades, combined with concerns about 
the quality of the products and the demand for safer food have led consumers to question 
modern agricultural practices. It has been found, that consumers consider the perceivable 
characteristics of food, such as appearance and taste, to be the most crucial factors in their 
choice of food (Magnusson et al., 2001). However, there is strong evidence that other not so 
easily tangible food attributes e.g. their quality and production process are becoming 
increasingly important (Torjusen et al., 2001). This new way of thinking led to an increase in 
the demand of organic produced agricultural products, which are perceived to be less damaging 
to the environment and healthier than conventionally grown ones (Schifferstein & Oude 
Ophuis, 1998; Williams & Hammit, 2001). 
Commonly, the products labeled as organic are promoted as being of higher quality 
and nutritional value, consequently creating a positive public opinion. Studies have shown that 
organic products are considered, by many consumers, to be superior solely based on criteria 
needed for organic production, such as the use of natural raw materials (Midmore et al., 2005; 
Saba & Messina, 2003). Moreover, in many studies, public concern on health issues appeared 
to be the main reason for buying organic food (Carboni, Vassallo, Conforti, & D’Amicis, 2000; 
Tregear, Dent, & McGregor, 1994). This public concern is part of a widespread unrest among 
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consumers about the quality of food we consume even though there is no unambiguous 
evidence that organic food is healthier than conventional (Torjusen, et al., 1999). 
In many instances, consumers seem willing to pay more money in order to buy 
products, especially fruit and vegetables, which are toxic-free and beneficial to their health (e.g. 
Tranter et al., 2009; Batte et al., 2007; Magnusson et al., 2003; Mc Eachern et al., 2005). In the 
literature several researches have been conducted focusing specifically on the determination of 
the consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for specific characteristics of goods (i.e. Combris et 
al., 2002). Most of these studies, based on a hypothetical scenario, aimed to provide evidence 
on how the quality signs influence the perceived quality of the product but fail to put the 
consumers under a real dilemma through which their real willingness to pay for these products 
can be observed. But what happens when the consumers are confronted with the true prices of 
such products? Do they actually buy them or does their stated willingness to pay differ from 
their real one?  
A general bias towards willingness to pay (WTP) elicitation methods for organic 
products, or for products which are labeled as "green" or "ecological" is, that consumers tend 
to show an innate preference for them. On the other hand, this attitude is, most of the times, 
overrated and evoked by the, so called, environmental awareness. It has often been argued  that 
when a clear and controlled motivation, aiming to reveal individuals’ true preference is absent, 
they may indicate higher WTP because such an attitude is considered to be politically correct 
(Camacho-Cuena et al., 2003 and 2004). As Nyborg (2000) points out, inexpensive statements 
regarding the willingness to pay in order to buy something can cause consumers to behave as 
"homo politicus". Conversely, at times when contributions have a real cost, consumers would 
behave as "homo economicus". 
The aim of the current research is to detect potential differences in the WTP between 
the Declared Willingness to Pay (DWTP) and the Real Willingness to Pay (RWTP) in a 
dichotomous choice experiment, setting participants to select between an organic and a 
conventional product of the same type. Technically, this experiment resembles a voting 
mechanism between two products. In such a voting mechanism what is required, except for the 
restriction to just two alternatives, is the assumption that individuals perceive their utilities to 
be affected by the outcome of the vote. Consequently, the understanding that their behavior will 
have a real effect on their utility causes the participants to act responsibly and vote honestly; 
ergo, the participants in the hypothetical part are indifferent toward their choices because there 
will be no impact on their utility. On the contrary, in the real part, the voting will affect their 
utility by affecting their real earnings. In similar experiments conducted by Camacho-Cuena et 
al. (2003 and 2004), no statistically significant difference was found between the declared and 
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the real WTP in a dichotomous choice experiment. Moreover, the “epsilon truthfulness” 
assumption (Cummings et al., 1997), which supports the view that participants will behave the 
same in the hypothetical part as they would in the real one, is put to question. 
The innovation of this research is that it is the first to experimentally validate survey 
data on WTP for a single environmental attribute of a market product when the descriptor 
“organic” is used, in order to define the origination of it. Along with comparisons of the 
consumers’ inclination for organic products, our within-participants design aims to compare 
stated and real WTP at an individual level. In this context, each participant’s stated WTP in the 
hypothetical part is compared to his/her real WTP drawn out in an experimental session, 
designed to be both economically feasible and appropriate for replicating a real world choice 
situation in a lab.  
3.2 Research Methodology 
 
Consider a model of vertical production line with two identical products differing only in a 
single attribute: the conditions of their production process. Products are labeled “conventional” 
and “organic” depending on the production methods employed, as designated by the current 
legislation.  
Consumers may have a positive consideration towards the organic origin of a product. 
In such a case, the indirect utility function of a consumer purchasing one unit of the 
conventional products is:  
𝑈𝑐 = 𝑅 − 𝑃𝑐 (1) 
Whereas, the purchase of a unit of the organic one implies a utility: 
𝑈𝑜 = 𝑅 +𝑊𝑖 − 𝑃𝑜 (2) 
R represents the consumer’s reservation price which, in other words, is the highest price that a 
consumer is willing to pay in order to buy the product, Pc the price of the conventional product, 
Po the price of the organic product, and Wi consumer i’s WTP for the organic product’s 
additional characteristics which create a “superior quality” predisposition.  
Consumers will grow more inclined toward the organic product to the conventional 
only if Uo>Uc, which implies that the following holds: 
𝑊𝑖 > 𝑃𝑜 − 𝑃𝑐 (3) 
The Equation (3) signifies that consumers buy the organic product only if their WTP for the 
characteristics of the organic product offsets the price difference across products.  
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3.3 Product Description 
 
The selected product for the experiment was green olives from the variety of Chalkidiki 
and of “Super Colossal” size, corresponding to 120 olives per kilogram, packaged in plastic 
packs suitable for food storage. The net weight of the final product was 450 gr and the average 
retail price in the markets was about 1.80 €. The reason for selecting this product was the fact 
that it is widespread in the market and is a widely consumed product. It is available in stores in 
various micro-packaging types, such as glass jars and plastic packs which are produced in 
numerous sizes with different net product weights. Therefore, taking into account the variety 
of prices of similar products in the market, the knowledge of the accurate selling price of the 
specific product by the participants was almost impossible.  
Moreover, it is noteworthy to say that olive products are perceived to be products of 
high nutritional value and therefore, many consumers prefer to buy the organic from the 
conventional ones which are used in the Mediterranean diet in a daily basis. Olives, fruit and 
vegetables are some of the few organic products of Greek origin which can be easily found in 
the Greek market and the organic products consumers have high preference to them (Krystallis 
et al., 2006). To that end, our product embraces a notable share of the market. 
3.3.1 Label Design 
 
In order to comply with the standards of the professional, two different labels were designed 
and created by a publishing firm in line with the international standards on professional 
packaging. In other words, a typical exportable package of olives was created along with two 
different labels to indicate that the first package contained olives of conventional farming while 
the second one contained olives of organic farming.  
The product’s brand name was chosen after a thorough market research and a new 
brand name was invented along with a unique logo.  The brand name “Greek Olive Grove” was 
assigned to the product since no other product existed with that brand name or a similar one 
and because it describes it in a clear manner. It was not translated into Greek and was the same 
on both packages, since the majority of similar products available in the international and in the 
Greek market have titles either in English or their titles are written with Latin characters to 
reflect its Greek name. The image, which was chosen to accompany the title, is a colored image 
of olive trees of Chalkidiki region. The label contained information concerning the expiration 
date, the content, the net weight of the product, and the country of origin accompanied by a 
Greek flag. At the bottom, a barcode and a traceability code (Lot Number) were inserted, 
elements which are essential for products that are in the production line. 
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The key elements that differentiated the two labels were the product description, their 
barcodes, their ingredients and their certification logos. The first product, the conventional 
olives of Chalkidiki was described as “Green Olives of Chalkidiki in Brine” while the second 
one, the organic olives of Chalkidiki was described as “Organic Green Olives of Chalkidiki in 
Brine” in both Greek and English. Both products also had a certification mark, which is 
compulsory for all the exported products (EuroCert). Additionally, the European label for 
organic products was inserted onto the alleged organic product. The EU quality label for 
organic products gets a product easily accepted by consumers and thus is a good marketing 
strategy but it is also necessary to the extent of differentiation between the two products 
(Krystallis et al., 2006). The mark was placed according to the specifications of the official 
labeling rules as they are posted on the European Union page for organic products (European 
Commission European Commission Agriculture and Rural Development, 2010 and 2015).  
 
Figure 3.1 The labels of the two products 
In our experiment, the aforementioned samples of table olives were 
used. The information that the participants had was that the only difference between them lies 
in the contents of each sample; one sample contained organic table olives while the other one 
contained conventional ones. This difference appeared on the ingredients written on the labels 
of each product (Figure 3.1). In fact both samples contained conventional olives preserved in 
brine, so that there is no difference in their general appearance. Each session was implemented 
on three successive phases during which no communication was permitted among the 
participants as depicted in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 Structure of the experiment 
3.4 Experiment 
In order to reassure that the thermal and comfort conditions were the same for all the 
participants, the experiment was carried out in the Business Economics and Environmental 
Technology (BETECO) laboratory in the Environmental Engineering Department of the 
Engineering School of the Democritus University of Thrace (Greece). The participants were 89 
university students from different academic years and faculties of the Engineering School, 
selected randomly so as to avoid the recirculation and the diffusion of the details of the 
experiment.  After entering the laboratory, the participants were instructed to fill in a brief 
questionnaire (see Appendix). The questionnaire was divided into three parts, each one 
corresponding to the three stages of the experiment.  
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Stage 1: Introductory stage 
In the first implemented stage, the initial part of the questionnaire (Questionnaire part I) was 
given to the participants and they were instructed to answer eight general questions regarding 
their perception on environmental and organic product issues, their eating habits of these 
products, and finally, some demographic questions. 
The goal of this part of the questionnaire was to create an environmental and behavioral 
profile for each one of the participants in order to determine the connection between the 
consumers’ attitude towards the environmental issues and their willingness to pay for “green 
products” (Laroche et al., 2001). Moreover, this part included one question requesting the 
perceived knowledge of English language since the brand name of the product was in written 
in English. After the participants responded to all the questions, the experimenter collected the 
questionnaires before the second stage of the experiment commenced. 
Stage 2: Hypothetical WTP part 
 
At this stage, the two packages were presented to the participants along with instructions and a 
description of the existing legislation on the production of organic farming products 
(Questionnaire part II).  
The validity of the responses to the hypothetical question ‘‘If you were given a pair of 
prices (Pc, Po), which package of table olives would you buy?” was tested using a within-
participants experiment. In this context, they were instructed to respond to a series of price-
scenarios. A table of fifteen (15) different pairs of price-scenarios was given to them and they 
had to choose for each price-scenario which one of the two products they were willing to buy. 
It was decided that the participants were given the opportunity to make repeated choices 
because by allowing them to practice, they had the opportunity to refine their 
responses into a more accurate reflection of the price at which they value the product (for more 
on this set up see Morisson, 1998). Moreover, this design helps us widen and expand the 
findings of previous researches in which the participants were faced with only one price 
scenario (Cummings et al., 1995) while at the same time facilitate the collection of more 
detailed information on each participant’s WTP. Furthermore, this design is appropriate so as 
to evade problems associated with a fully open question. This elicitation method establishes the 
context in which the bids should be submitted while avoiding starting point bias. Additionally, 
the number of outliers is also reduced in comparison to open-ended and dichotomous choice 
formats. 
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In each scenario, the organic olives’ price takes a different value ranging from below 
to quite above the conventional products’ price. The latter price keeps in line with the price in 
which the product was actually sold in the retail market. Table 3.1 presents the elicitation 
question format. In the experiment, this question becomes ‘‘Which olives would you buy?’’ 
Table 3.1 Format of the specific question of the Questionnaire Part II. 
Scenario 
Conventional 
Olives’ price (Pc) 
Organic Olives’ 
price     (Po) 
Scenario 1  1.80€  1.00€ 
Scenario 2  1.80€  1.20€ 
Scenario 3  1.80€  1.40€ 
Scenario 4  1.80€  1.60€ 
Scenario 5  1.80€  1.80€ 
Scenario 6  1.80€  2.00€ 
Scenario 7  1.80€  2.20€ 
Scenario 8  1.80€  2.40€ 
Scenario 9  1.80€  2.60€ 
Scenario 10  1.80€  2.80€ 
Scenario 11  1.80€  3.00€ 
Scenario 12  1.80€  3.20€ 
Scenario 13  1.80€  3.40€ 
Scenario 14  1.80€  3.60€ 
Scenario 15  1.80€  3.80€ 
After the participants were done answering the questionnaire, the experimenters 
collected the answer sheets. Participants did not receive any information concerning the next 
parts of the session, nor could they assume that their behavior in this part of the experiment 
could be individually compared to their decisions in the following parts. This element was 
further supported by the fact that the whole session was conducted anonymously. Participants 
had no knowledge of the results obtained from this part before proceeding to the next one.  
Stage 3: Real WTP part 
 
In the real WTP part of the session, the participants were given the instructions together with a 
leaflet describing the characteristics of the olives, the legislation (in the exact same way as in 
the hypothetical part of the session), and the price-scenarios table (Questionnaire Part III). In 
addition to that, they were given an endowment of 5€ part of which, as they have been 
instructed, should be spent to buy one of the two table olives available. At the end of this 
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procedure, a lottery (in which each one of the fifteen scenarios was equally likely to be chosen) 
was conducted for each participant in the interest of indicating the scenario that would 
determine his/her payment. The participants’ actual earnings depended on the strategy chosen 
in the scenario randomly selected by the lottery. Their payment was the difference between 
their initial endowment (5€) and the price corresponding to the product they had previously 
chosen (Stage 3) to buy for the scenario selected by the lottery (e.g. 5.00-1.60=3.40€, if organic 
olives were selected in scenario 4). The payment was made after the end of this stage and the 
participants also received the product of their choice in the selected scenario. 
Following the accomplishment of this stage, the decision tables were handed out to the 
experimenter. 
The goal of these two sessions (Stage 2 and Stage 3) was to track down potential 
differences between the participants’ declared willingness to pay (DWTP) for the two products 
in the hypothetical part (Stage 2) and their real willingness to pay (RWTP) for those products 
in the real part (Stage 3). Based on this, our research hypothesis is formulated. 
H1: There is a difference between the declared willingness to pay (DWTP) and the 
real willingness to pay (RWTP) for organic olives. 
By all means, such a design is not appropriate for assessing the importance of possible 
ordering effects. Such effects, however, were not proven significant. A further source of strong 
ordering effects may be the time schedule of the experiment that asked the participants to reply 
to the hypothetical and to the real part in limited time. It is true that in order to reach safe 
conclusions about the results of this research, the current data should be compared to 
experiments conducted principally under real conditions or to ones that have been conducted 
over a longer time span. Keeping this in mind, the current experiment does not aim to be 
regarded as a general method for validating stated preferences in survey questions but has a 
purpose to investigate human behavior under a certain economic scenario. 
3.5 Results 
In this section, the results obtained from the experiment are presented. It consists of general 
findings, WTP intra-stages analysis, and WTP analysis. In the post-session analysis of the 
responses, a small number of participants (3 out of 89) seem to have followed totally random 
and irrational patterns of choice. Thus, their behavior is excluded from any further data analysis.  
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3.5.1 Introductory questions and Descriptive statistics 
 
In Table 3.2, there is a presentation of the data collected from the answers to the questions 
concerning respondents’ perception on environmental and organic products issues and their 
consumption habits of these products. The vast majority of the participants declared that they 
consider the environmental issues to be very important (62.9%) and important (32.6%). 
Nonetheless, these findings are not implying that the participants are informed about the 
procedure of the production of organic agriculture products since 44.2% of them stated that 
they are a little informed and 20.9% that they are neither informed, nor uninformed. Finally, it 
is clear that most of the individuals participating in the current experiment are not frequent 
buyers of organic products considering 30.2% of them buy such products scarcely and 48.8% 
buy them some times.   
Table 3.2 Responses given to the introductory questions 
Participants' declared 
importance of environmental 
issues 
Participants' information level 
on the procedure of the 
production of organic 
agricultural products 
Participants‘ 
frequency of 
purchasing organic 
products 
Unimportant 1.2% Not informed 9.3% Never 7.0% 
Relatively 
unimportant 
1.2% 
A little informed 
44.2% 
Scarcely 
30.2% 
Neither important,    
nor unimportant 
2.3% Neither informed, 
nor uninformed 
20.9% Some times 48.8% 
Important 32.6% Informed 22.1% Frequently 12.8% 
Very important 62.9% Very informed 3.5% Always 1.2% 
 
3.5.2 Socioeconomics and organic farming questions’ analysis 
 
The analysis of the responses given to the first stage of the experiment provided some insights 
about our sample which are summarized as follows. First off, the more informed the participants 
were on the procedure of the production of the organic products, the more probable they were 
to buy them with more frequency (rs=0.294, p=0.006). Along with that, participants with higher 
stated frequency of purchasing organic products were willing to spend more money to buy 
them in both the hypothetical (rs=0.376, p<0.001) and the real part (rs =0.321, p=0.003). 
Additionally, participants who are members of associations for the protection of the natural 
environment stated to be more informed on the procedure of the production of organic products 
(UM-W=49.5, p=0.013) and purchase them more frequently (UM-W=71, p=0.039) than those who 
do not belong in such associations. 
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Furthermore, a gender effect exists concerning the sensitivity of environmental issues 
and the frequency of buying organic products. The female participants of the experiment were 
found to consider environmental issues more important (UM-W =707.5 p=0.030) and buy organic 
products more frequently (UM-W =705, p=0.044) than men. 
3.5.3 WTP intra-stages analysis and descriptive statistics 
 
The Table 3.3 presents the percentage of participants purchasing the organic olives according 
to their responses in the hypothetical and the real part in the experiment.  
Table 3.3 Percentage of responses for Willingness to buy for the organic olives for each one 
of the fifteen scenarios. 
Price (in €) 
DWTB (%) 
(Hypothetical part) 
RWTB (%) 
(Real part) 
Difference 
(%) 
1.00 98.84 98.84 0.00 
1.20 98.84 98.84 0.00 
1.40 100.00 100.00 0.00 
1.60 100.00 100.00 0.00 
1.80 95.35 95.35 0.00 
2.00 90.70 87.21 3.49 
2.20 81.40 76.74 4.65 
2.40 66.28 62.79 3.49 
2.60 53.49 56.98 -3.49 
2.80 44.19 43.02 1.16 
3.00 27.91 33.72 -5.81 
3.20 19.77 22.09 -2.33 
3.40 12.79 18.60 -5.81 
3.60 11.63 17.44 -5.81 
3.80 10.47 15.12 -4.65 
 
Observe that, when the price of the organic olives is equal to or lower than that of the 
standard olives (1.80€), almost all the subjects prefer to buy the organic olives. This fact proves 
the existence of a vertical differentiation aspect regarding the way in which the two products 
are perceived by consumers, introduced by the labeling of a product as organic. The gradual 
increase of the price of the organic olives lowers, as expected, the percentage of consumers 
who prefer to buy it instead of the standard one. This data is confirmed in both the hypothetical 
and the real part of the experiment.  
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A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used so as to verify that the DWTP and RWTP are 
not normally distributed (p=0.010 for DWTP and p=0.002 for RWTP). Therefore, non-
parametric tests are used to check for intra-treatment differences (all tests are performed at 5% 
level of significance).   
After performing a two-tailed Wilcoxon test, it was discovered that the differences in 
the willingness to buy between the two stages are not statistically significant (p=0.868). 
Moreover, as shown in Figure 3.3, the willingness to buy (WTB) organic products is equal to 
that of conventional products at the price of 2.6€ in both the hypothetical and the real part. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 3.3 Willingness to buy for the organic and conventional olives for the fifteen price scenarios in 
the hypothetical (a) and in real part (b) 
Furthermore, from straightforward calculations of the data presented in Table 3.3, we 
realize that the optimal price for a firm selling the organic olives is 2€ since, at this price, the 
profit π (π = Price * WTB) in both hypothetical and real part is maximized.  
In Table 3.4 we present the descriptive statistics on the declared (in the hypothetical 
part) and the revealed (in the real part) WTP of the organic olives denoted as DWTP and RWTP 
respectively.  
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Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics of the declared and revealed WTP 
Statistics DWTP RWTP 
Minimum 1.600 1.600 
25%  
Percentile 2.200 2.200 
Median 2.600 2.600 
75%  
Percentile 3.000 3.000 
Maximum 3.800 3.800 
Mode 2.800 2.600 
Mean 2.626 2.660 
Std. Deviation 0.600 0.667 
 
It should be noted that the mean value of the RWTP is slightly higher than the one of 
the DWTP but the median value is the same for both variables. Regarding the spread of the 
responses, we see a higher dispersion in the data collected in the real part as compared to those 
in the hypothetical part (the statistical significance of the differences with non-parametric tests 
is discussed below).  
Overall, in both the hypothetical and the real part of the experiment, the participants 
behave in a totally consistent way with their declared preferences (rs=0.383, p<0.001 
and rs=0.334, p=0.002 respectively) on buying organic agricultural products (Questionnaire, 
part I). In addition to that, even though there is no indication in the hypothetical part that the 
participants’ awareness level on the procedures of production of the organic products affects 
the WTP for them (rs=0.154, p=0.157), in the real part such an indication exists and is 
statistically significant (rs=0.249, p=0.021).  
The main result of our analysis can be obtained from a Wilcoxon paired rank test: there 
is no statistically significant difference between WTP in the hypothetical part and WTP in 
the real part (p=0.673). Therefore H1 is rejected. 
The scheduling of the decision making that each participant has to cope with (first, the 
answer to the hypothetical and then the real part) and our interest in the value of the hypothetical 
part as a reliable predictor of future actions, justifies the need to identify the degree to which a 
participant’s RWTP could reliably be predicted by his DWTP. That is, if the participants’ 
declared willingness to pay in the hypothetical scenario reflected their actions in the real one.  
In an attempt to test this hypothesis we regress participants’ RWTP over DWTP.  
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Table 3.5 RWTP estimation results for organic olives 
Statistics 
& 
Variables 
Model  
?̂? t-statistic 
C 0.230 1.272 
DWTP 0.926 13.781 
R²  0.693 
 
It is worth noticing that DWTP is significant at 1 ‰ significance level (p<0.001). As shown in 
Table 3.5, there is a positive correlation between the RWTP and the DWTP which means that 
a unit increase in the declared WTP will cause an increase in the real one. From the R2 we see 
that the DWTP in our model predicts the RWTP at level of 69.3%.  
3.6 Discussion  
Divergence was observed in the participants' responses regarding their preferences in organic 
products and the additional amount they intend to pay in order to purchase them. In the literature 
a similar differentiation is observed among consumers and the premium price that they are 
willing to pay varies (Krystallis et al., 2006). This diversity in preferences has also been 
investigated in depth and is often explained by the difficulty the consumers have when they 
have to make logical choices in complex purchasing conditions (Hjelmar, 
2010). This lack of a rational way of thinking often leads them to unsound judgment and they 
act based on their habits. As several researches have shown (i.e. Lodziak, 2002; Wood & Neal 
2009), many consumer activities are formed on daily routines.  
 Furthermore, the observed difficulty of a decision can be presumed that derives from 
conflicting attitudes towards organic and, in general, towards green products. A survey 
conducted by Laroche et al. (2001) stated that the fact that an increasing number of people 
willing to pay more for green products is, perhaps, the most convincing evidence that supports 
the development of an ecologically favorable consumer behavior. Yet, there are several reasons 
responsible for an unfavorable attitude towards organic products. These are, primarily, the 
perception of their high price and their low availability, the lack of trust in the biological signal 
and the general misunderstanding of organic production (Zotos et al., 1999; Chryssochoidis, 
2000; Fotopoulos & Krystallis, 2002a, 2002b). 
Moreover, experiments and surveys have two distinctive features compared to real 
markets: limited time and limited knowledge. While in a real market a consumer may take time 
to gather information about the product before making his/her decision, a respondent in an 
experiment or survey has to report or act upon a WTP value which is provided by the researcher 
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during the experiment or survey. 
Regarding the socio-demographic profiles of consumers of organic products they are 
mostly female, who buy larger quantities and more often than men. This statement is consistent 
with the results of our study in which female participants consider environmental issues more 
vital and buy organic products more frequently (e.g. Tregear et al., 1994; Grunert & Juhl, 1995; 
Davies et al., 1995; Reicks et al, 1997; Latacz-Lohmann & Foster, 1997; Govindasamy & Italia, 
1999; Ureña et al., 2008). 
According to Laroche et al. (2001) the consumers’ attitude towards the environment is 
a very good indicator of their WTP for green products. This opinion, though, contradicts the 
results of our research. Despite the fact that 95.5% of the respondents answered "very 
important" and "important", when asked about how important they consider the environmental 
issues to be, this statement surprisingly shows no correlation to their WTP for those products 
neither in the hypothetical nor in the real part of the experiment. This conclusion 
is also supported by Vlosky et al. (1999) who report that consumers are split regarding the level 
of their environmental awareness and their willingness to choose more expensive 
environmentally oriented products. 
Furthermore according to Krystallis et al. (2006), Greek consumers are more familiar 
with the idea of paying more to purchase fresh organic products; hence the WTP for these 
products reflects the real and not merely their hypothetical behavior. This statement is in line 
with the results of our research as in both the hypothetical and the real part of the experiment, 
the participants behave consistently with their stated preferences in the questionnaire and their 
responses in those parts, in average, show no deviation. These results go along with findings 
from Camacho-Cuena et al. (2003) who report no difference between the declared and the real 
willingness to pay, in a similar experiment. In the cases in which the participants stated a WTP 
that was significantly higher from the average, they behaved in consistent ways with their 
selections in the real part they revealed similarly high WTP. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The current study aimed to investigate whether difference between the declared and the real 
willingness to pay (WTP) exists in agricultural products when the descriptor “organic” is used, 
in order to define the origination of one of them. In order to achieve that, we run a dichotomous 
choice experiment, setting participants to select between an organic and a conventional product 
of the same type. For that reason, two products under the label "Organic Green Olives of 
Chalkidiki in Brine" and "Green Olives of Chalkidiki in Brine" were used. In the hypothetical 
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part of the experiment the participants declared their preference and their WTP for each one of 
the two products while in the real part, a payment in cash was implemented along with the 
possibility of being rewarded with the product valued.  
Despite the fact that a diversity was observed in the participants' answers regarding 
their preferences in organic products and the additional amount they intend to pay in order to 
purchase them, no significant difference was found between their DWTP and their RWTP. This 
result reflects the Greek consumers’ behavior towards the organic products according to which 
they are used to pay more in order to buy fresh organic products hence the WTP for these 
products reflects the real and not just their hypothetical behavior.  
Overall, these results should not be generalized arbitrarily, bearing in mind some 
limitations of our study. First, even though the design of the experiment permits us to replicate 
real choice conditions, the conditions of the study remain those of a laboratory experiment. 
Moreover, as in all surveys, sample representativeness is always of concern to the researcher. 
This sample does not claim to be representative of the Greek population, and therefore accepts 
the limitations regarding the extent to which our findings can be generalized to broader 
populations. 
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3.8 Appendix  
Instructions (translated from Greek) 
Thank you for your participation in this experiment. The goal of this experiment is to study the 
economic behavior of consumers under a specific scenario. The instructions are easy to follow 
and there is a chance to win an amount of money in a confidential manner, given that none of 
the other participants will have any information on the amount of money you have gained. In 
this experiment there are no solidly correct or wrong answers. However, keep in mind that your 
decisions will affect the amount of money you gain. You can ask the experimenter in case you 
have any doubts about the process of the experiment by raising your hand. The procedure of 
the experiment is as follows: 
            1. You are requested to fill in the following short questionnaire at your own discretion. 
Remember that there are no correct and wrong answers. 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE PART I.  
 
1. How important are environmental issues to you?  
 
 Very Important  Important Neither important, nor unimportant  Unimportant 
Very Unimportant 
2. Are you member of any associations devoted to the protection of the natural 
environment?  
 
No Yes (Please specify in which one) 
3. How informed are you on the procedure of the production of organic agricultural 
products?  
 
Very informed Informed Neither informed, nor uniformed  Uniformed  Very 
uninformed 
4. How often do you buy organic products? 
 
Never Scarcely Sometimes Often Always 
5. What is your English language level? 
Level A1 “Elementary knowledge” 
Level A2 “Pre-Intermediate knowledge” 
Level B1 “Intermediate knowledge” 
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Level B2 “Upper intermediate knowledge” 
Level C1 “Advanced knowledge” 
Level C2 “Proficient knowledge” 
6. Gender: Male Female 
7. Age: 
8. Annual family income (in €): 
A.  No income  
B.  1 -7.000               
C.  7.001-14.000       
D.  14.001-21.000  
E.  21.001-28.000  
F.  28.001-42.000  
G.  42.001-56.000  
H.  56.001-70.000  
I.  >70.000            
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2. Thank you very much for your answers. Now you are asked to fill in the following 
questionnaire concerning the willingness to pay for two different samples of table olives. The 
only difference between the two samples is that the first contains conventional table olives, 
while the second contains organic table olives and (possibly) their cost. Feel free to 
read about the characteristics of each sample in the following brochure in which you can see 
photos of the product described. (The experimenter shows the participant the real product along 
with the questionnaire) 
QUESTIONNAIRE PART II 
Conventional table olives Organic table olives 
The two products are identical, except for the 
characteristics described below 
 
Characteristics 
 
 The production follows the 
European Directive on integrated 
production of olives. 
 The production follows an 
intensive cultivation method of 
high inflows 
 The use of synthetic-chemical / 
inorganic-nitrogen fertilizers is 
permitted 
 It is permitted to use herbicides / 
insecticides 
Characteristics 
 
 Use in production exclusively rural / 
natural ingredients which have been 
authorized by the Commission or 
EU Member States. 
 The production follows a gentle 
cultivation process of low input 
 The use in the production of a 
limited number of additives 
(preservatives, organic soil 
conditioners) is allowed under 
certain conditions authorized by the 
Commission. 
 Prohibition of fragrance and dyes 
use in the production process. 
 Methods for strengthening the 
sustainable development are used. 
 It is ensured that the organic and 
non-organic olives are stored and 
processed separately throughout the 
production process. 
 
We will now show you fifteen (15) price-scenarios. For every pair of prices you are 
asked to make your purchase decision (between Conventional or Organic table olives) and mark 
only one of the products in each scenario. 
 Prices A) Conventional 
Olives 
Β) Organic Olives A) Conventional 
Olives 
Β) Organic Olives 
Scenario 1. 1.80€ 1.00€   
Scenario 2. 1.80€ 1.20€   
Scenario 3. 1.80€ 1.40€   
Scenario 4. 1.80€ 1.60€   
Scenario 5. 1.80€ 1.80€   
Scenario 6. 1.80€ 2.00€   
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Scenario 7. 1.80€ 2.20€   
Scenario 8. 1.80€ 2.40€   
Scenario 9. 1.80€ 2.60€   
Scenario 10. 1.80€ 2.80€   
Scenario 11. 1.80€ 3.00€   
Scenario 12. 1.80€ 3.20€   
Scenario 13. 1.80€ 3.40€   
Scenario 14. 1.80€ 3.60€   
Scenario 15. 1.80€ 3.80€   
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3. Thank you for your answers. Now you have an initial endowment of 5€. You should 
use this endowment to buy one unit of anyone of the two goods: “Conventional table olives” 
and “Organic table olives”, both described in the brochure attached to this instruction sheet. As 
you will see, the only difference between these two products is that one of them is an organic 
product while the other one is not (and possibly their prices).  You can study the characteristics 
of each sample in the following brochure in which you can see photos of the product described. 
(The experimenter shows the participant the real product along with the questionnaire) 
QUESTIONNAIRE PART III 
Conventional table olives Organic table olives 
The two products are identical, except for the 
characteristics described below 
 
Characteristics 
 
 The production follows the 
European Directive on integrated 
production of olives. 
 The production follows an 
intensive cultivation method of 
high inflows 
 The use of synthetic-chemical / 
inorganic-nitrogen fertilizers is 
permitted 
 It is permitted to use herbicides / 
insecticides 
Characteristics 
 
 Use in production exclusively rural / 
natural ingredients which have been 
authorized by the Commission or 
EU Member States. 
 The production follows a gentle 
cultivation process of low input 
 The use in the production of a 
limited number of additives 
(preservatives, organic soil 
conditioners) is allowed under 
certain conditions authorized by the 
Commission. 
 Prohibition of fragrance and dyes 
use in the production process. 
 Methods for strengthening the 
sustainable development are used. 
 It is ensured that the organic and 
non-organic olives are stored and 
processed separately throughout the 
production process. 
 
We will now show you fifteen (15) price-scenarios. Make your purchase decision 
(Conventional or Organic table olives) for every pair of prices and mark only one of the 
products in each scenario. 
 Prices A) Conventional 
Olives 
Β) Organic Olives A) Conventional 
Olives 
Β) Organic Olives 
Scenario 1. 1.80€ 1.00€   
Scenario 2. 1.80€ 1.20€   
Scenario 3. 1.80€ 1.40€   
Scenario 4. 1.80€ 1.60€   
Scenario 5. 1.80€ 1.80€   
Scenario 6. 1.80€ 2.00€   
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Scenario 7. 1.80€ 2.20€   
Scenario 8. 1.80€ 2.40€   
Scenario 9. 1.80€ 2.60€   
Scenario 10. 1.80€ 2.80€   
Scenario 11. 1.80€ 3.00€   
Scenario 12. 1.80€ 3.20€   
Scenario 13. 1.80€ 3.40€   
Scenario 14. 1.80€ 3.60€   
Scenario 15. 1.80€ 3.80€   
 
At the end of the session, a lottery will be drawn for each participant so as to decide 
which one of the fifteen pairs of prices corresponds to the scenario you will actually be faced 
with. Your actual earnings depend on the strategy chosen in the scenario drawn in the lottery. 
Your payment, at the end of this part of the experiment, will be the difference between 
your initial endowment and the price corresponding to the product you have chosen for the 
scenario drawn in the lottery (for example 5-1.80=3.20€). You will also be given the product 
you previously chose to buy. 
 
